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Abstract
Security Games employ game theoretical tools to
derive resource allocation strategies in security do-
mains. Recent works considered the presence of
alarm systems, even suffering various forms of un-
certainty, and showed that disregarding alarm sig-
nals may lead to arbitrarily bad strategies. The cen-
tral problem with an alarm system, unexplored in
other Security Games, is finding the best strategy
to respond to alarm signals for each mobile defen-
sive resource. The literature provides results for
the basic single–resource case, showing that even
in that case the problem is computationally hard.
In this paper, we focus on the challenging problem
of designing algorithms scaling with multiple re-
sources. First, we focus on finding the minimum
number of resources assuring non–null protection
to every target. Then, we deal with the computation
of multi–resource strategies with different degrees
of coordination among resources. For each consid-
ered problem, we provide a computational analysis
and propose algorithmic methods.
1 Introduction
Security Games represent one of the most successful applica-
tion of non–cooperative game theory in the real world [Jain et
al., 2012]. The basic approach is to model a security situation
with a 2–player game, between a Defender and an Attacker,
and to derive the best strategy of the Defender, most of the
times according to the Stackelberg paradigm. A wide litera-
ture on Security Games studies issues like resource schedul-
ing constraints [Kiekintveld et al., 2009], bounded rational-
ity [Yang et al., 2011], Attacker’s observation models [An et
al., 2013], protection of infrastructures [Blum et al., 2014].
Real security systems are equipped with sensors that are
capable to trigger alarms when attacks are detected but may
suffer from various forms of uncertainty. Mobile defensive
resources (a.k.a. patrollers) can respond to alarm signals cov-
ering the targets potentially under attack. It is demonstrated
that disregarding alarm signals may lead to strategies arbi-
trarily worse than those obtained when alarm signals are ex-
ploited. Nevertheless, the study of how to include alarm sys-
tems in Security Games is largely unexplored and represents
one of the most challenging open problems in the field. In
particular, the central question is: given an alarm signal, how
should the Defender respond to it at best? [Basilico et al.,
2015a] study the scenario with only one resource available
to the Defender and with sensors suffering from spatial un-
certainty, i.e., an alarm signal is raised whenever an attack
is performed, but the Defender is uncertain on the actual at-
tacked location, as in border patrolling [Agmon et al., 2008].
In such situations, the best strategy is to stay in a location,
wait for an alarm signal and then respond to it at best. This
last task is proved APX–hard. [Basilico et al., 2016] study
the scenario with sensors suffering both from spatial uncer-
tainty and false negatives when only one resource is available
to the Defender, showing that it is PSPACE–hard. For small
missed detection rates, placing in a location and responding to
an alarm signal keeps to be the best strategy for the Defender,
while for large missed detection rates the best strategy is to
patrol a number of targets even in absence of alarm signals
and respond to an alarm signal once triggered.
Original contributions. In this paper, we focus on settings
with a spatial uncertain alarm system and multiple defensive
resources. Here the challenge is to design algorithms able to
scale with the resources. We provide some original contri-
butions. In real–world settings, due to budget constraints, it
is important to minimize the number of resources assuring a
minimum protection level. We study the problem of finding
the minimum number of resources assuring non–null protec-
tion to every target.
This number corresponds to the lower bound over the num-
ber of resources one should employ in practice. We show that
the problem is log–APX–complete on general graphs, while
it is in P for special graphs, such as trees and cycles, that are
rather usual in real–world applications. Then, we study the
problem of finding the best strategy to respond to any alarm
signal once a disposition of resources in the environment is
given, according to different degrees of coordination among
the resources. Finally, we propose an approach that includes
the previous algorithms and that returns in anytime fashion
the best disposition of resources. For each of our algorithms,
we provide a thorough experimental evaluation showing that
they can solve realistic settings.
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2 Security game model and previous results
Our security game is a generalization of [Basilico et al.,
2015b], obtained allowing the Defender to control an arbi-
trary number of m resources instead of just a single one. We
summarize its main features. A patrolling setting is a graph
G “ pV,Eq representing an environment where areas that
can be attacked are given by n target vertices, denoted as
T Ď V . A target t P T has a value piptq P p0, 1s and requires
dptq P N` time units (penetration time) to be compromised.
Edges in E are unitary, while ωi˚,j is the smallest traveling
cost beweem vertices i and j. An alarm system pS, pq gen-
erates a signal s P S if target t is attacked with probability
pps | tq. S, p and any generated signal s are public knowl-
edge. We call T psq “ tt P T | pps | tq ą 0u the support of
a signal s and Sptq “ ts P S | pps | tq ą 0u the support of
a target t. We assume that ppH | tq “ pps | Hq “ 0 for any
t P T and s P S, i.e., there are no false positives or missed
detections, and that |Sptq| ě 1 for any t P T .
A 2–player security game takes place between an Attacker
A and a Defender D. In this game, A seeks to gain value by
compromising some target while D can control m defending
resources by specifying a movement strategy for them. At
any turn of the game, A and D play simultaneously: A ob-
serves the position of the m and decides whether to attack a
target (we assume that A can instantly reach the attacked tar-
get, this can be relaxed as shown in [Basilico et al., 2009].)
or to wait. On the opposite side, D has no information about
A but, if an attack is present, it observes the alarm signal and
decides where to allocate the m resources. Each resource can
be allocated either to the same vertex or to an adjacent one. If
A attacks target t and a resource is allocated on t in any of the
next dptq turns, then D and A receive payoffs of 1 and 0, re-
spectively. Otherwise, they receive 1´piptq and piptq. A route
r for a single resource is a sequence of targets to which the
resource is moved where lr is the route length, rpiq is the i–th
assigned target and Aprpiqq “ ři´1h“1 ω˚rphq,rph`1q is the time
between visits to rp1q and rpiq. We say that rs,j is a covering
route for resource j under signal s if, @i P t1, . . . , lru, we
have that rpiq P T psq and Aprpiqq ď dprpiqq. The interpreta-
tion is that when s is generated, having a resource following
r will guarantee protection over T psq. A joint covering route
is an m–tuple rs “ xrs,1, rs,2, . . . , rs,my. To simplify the
notation, we will omit signal s when clear from the context.
The resolution approach for m “ 1 is given in [Basilico
et al., 2015b]. With no false positives and missed detections,
the best strategy for the patroller is to stay on a vertex, wait
for a signal, and then respond to it at best. The same holds
with multiple resources (the extension of the proof is straight-
forward) and allows us to decompose the problem into two
phases: determining the best signal response strategy from
every vertex (Signal Response Game), and then determining
the best vertex in which the patroller can place (Patrolling
Game). Once a signal s is received, D has to respond by
randomizing over the possible covering routes under signal
s and starting from v. The signal response strategy is de-
fined as σDv “ pσDv,s1 , σDv,s2 , . . .q, that is a response strategy
for every possible signal. Despite the game being constant–
sum, the problem is shown to be APX–hard, its difficulty
mainly being in generating the covering routes under a sig-
nal s and starting from v. An approximation algorithm for
such difficult subproblem is given in [Basilico et al., 2015a].
With multiple resources, several questions, related to finding
the best number of resources to employ, their placement, and
their signal response strategies, arise. In the next sections, we
provide some answers to them.
3 Minimizing the number of resources
Ideally, the determination of the best number of defensive re-
sources must take into account both the level of protection
that can be achieved and the costs of additional resources.
The minimum protection level a Defender should guarantee
is that for each target t P T there is at least a resource in a
vertex v with ωv˚,t ď dptq, such that it can cover t by dptq,
thus stopping a potential ongoing attack. The least number
of resources satisfying this requirement represents the lower
bound necessary for the protection of any environment, while
the upper bound is the number of resources such that, for any
signal s, there is a response strategy to s covering all the tar-
gets in T psq thus assuring the Defender a utility of 1. Here
we study the problem of computing the minimum number of
resources guaranteeing each target a non–null protection. We
start by defining the concept of covering placement.
Definition 1 (Covering Placement) A covering placement
is defined as a set of vertices P “ tp1, . . . , pmu where
pi P V , pi ‰ pj if i ‰ j and for every target t P T there
exists a pi P P such that ωp˚i,t ď dptq.
3.1 Arbitrary instances
With arbitrary graphs, we state the following results.
Theorem 1 Computing the minimum covering placement is
log–APX–hard even in the basic case all the vertices are
targets with penetration times equal to 1.
Proof. Log–APX–hardness of our problem is direct from
DOMINATING–SET [Escoffier and Paschos, 2006] that is
known to be log–APX–complete. This latter problem is de-
fined as follows: given a graph G “ pV ,Eq, minimize |V 1|
with V
1 Ď V with the property that for all v P V zV 1 there
is at least a v1 P V 1 such that pv, v1q P E. Every instance of
DOMINATING–SET with graph G is equivalent to the prob-
lem of minimizing the covering placement over graph G in
which all the vertices V are targets and have d “ 1. l
Theorem 2 Computing the minimum covering placement is
in log–APX .
Proof. The membership to log–APX follows from the fact
that every instance of our problem can be formulated in direct
way as a SET–COVER instance and that SET–COVER in is
in log–APX [Chvatal, 1979]—our problem is more general
than DOMINATING–SET, this justifies the need to consider
SET–COVER. More precisely, given an instance of our prob-
lem, for each vertex v P V we can find in polynomial time
the set of targets t such that ωv˚,t ď dptq. Thus, we map
set T to the universe set of SET–COVER and each vertex v
to a set in SET–COVER. The objective functions of the two
problems are the same. Therefore, every α approximation of
SET–COVER is also an α approximation of our problem. l
The proof of Theorem 2 is based on the fact that every
instance of our problem can be formulated in direct way as
a SET–COVER instance. As a consequence we can find a
solution to our problem by formulating it as a SET–COVER
and then by using algorithms for this latter problem: integer
linear programming (ILP) for finding the exact solution and
greedy algorithms to find an approximate solution [Chvatal,
1979]. In our approach, we also apply a local search [Musliu,
2006] to the solution generated by the greedy algorithm to
improve its quality.
3.2 Special instances: tree and cycle graphs
Interestingly, in particular instances that are rather usual in
real–world applications the problem is optimally solvable in
polynomial time. Let us start from the following lemma.
Algorithm 1 TM(v)
1: if v is a leaf then
2: return p8, dpvq ´ 1q
3: else
4: for all v1 P Succpvq do
5:
`
Covpv1q, UnCovpv1q˘Ð TM`v1˘
6: if min
v1
tUnCovpv1q, dpvqu ´min
v1
Covpv1q ě 0 then
7: return pmin
v1
Covpv1q ` 1,8q
8: else if min
v1
tUnCovpv1q, dpvqu ´ 1 ě 0 then
9: return p8,min
v1
tUnCovpv1q, dpvqu ´ 1q
10: else
11: resv Ð 1
12: return p1,8q
Lemma 3 A minimum covering placement in a tree rooted in
vˆ can be computed in polynomial time with Algorithm 1 by
calling TMpvˆq.
Algorithm 1 works recursively taking as input a vertex
v P V . To ease its description, let us assume that T “ V .
The case including non–target vertices only amounts to minor
modifications. Binary variables resv are initially set to 0 and
their assertion corresponds to place a resource on v P V . With
Succpvq Ď V we denote all the immediate successors of v on
the path leaving the root. The idea is to recursively allocate
resources by processing the graph in a bottom–up fashion,
from its leaves to the root. Let us consider a function call for
a generic vertex v. By recursively invoking TMpv1q for each
v1 P Succpvq we get, for each successor, a coverage profile
defined with a pair of values
`
Covpv1q, UnCovpv1q˘. They
encode the following conditions under the currently built re-
source placement. If variables resν of the subtree rooted in
v1 constitute a coverage placement for whole the subtree, the
coverage profile is such that Covpv1q “ k ă 8 where k is
the distance between v and the closest resource on such sub-
tree and UnCovpv1q “ 8. Otherwise, the coverage profile is
such that Covpv1q “ 8 and UnCovpv1q “ k ă 8 where k
is the distance from v by which we need to place a resource
to have a coverage placement for the subtree rooted in v1.
We start from an empty placement and derive coverage
profiles recursively from the base case in which v is a leaf
(Line 1). Since deadlines are non–null and costs are unitary,
a resource on a leaf is never necessary: we can always cover
it from any ancestor whose distance from v is ď dpvq ´ 1.
Hence the coverage profile for the base case is p8, dpvq ´ 1q
(Line 2).
Let us consider the recursive step in which v is a non–leaf
vertex. From Line 6 we have all the coverage profiles of each
one of the immediate successors of v and we must return the
coverage profile of v and decide if a resource must be placed
on it. We have three cases.
• Case 1 (Lines 6–7): if the condition of Line 6 is satisfied
then the subtree rooted at v is covered by the resources
we placed in such subtree. Hence we do not need any re-
source in v. Moreover, the father of v will be at distance
min
v1
Covpv1q ` 1 from the closest of such resources.
• Case 2 (Lines 8–9): if the condition of Line 8 is
satisfied then the subtree rooted at v is not covered
by the resources we placed in such subtree. We can
achieve coverage by placing a resource in v or in
any ancestor whose distance from v should not exceed
min
v1
tUnCovpv1q, dpvqu´1. Since we are trying to min-
imize the number of resources, there is always interest in
postponing a resource allocation in our bottom–up pro-
cessing of the tree. Therefore, we do not allocate a re-
source in v and we return the strategy profile naturally
resulting from the above considerations (Line 9).
• Case 3 (Lines 11–12): if none of the previous two cases
is verified, then no resource in any ancestor of v can
complete the coverage for the subtree rooted at v. We
are forced to place a resource in v which makes the as-
sociated coverage profile equal to p1,8q (Line 12).
Algorithm 1 can be adopted also to solve cycle graphs by
extracting the n linear subgraphs spanning all the n targets,
solving each of them with Algorithm 1, and then selecting the
solution with the least number of resources. We summarize
the above positive results in the following theorem.
Theorem 4 Given k, deciding if there exists a covering
placement with size m ď k is P for trees and cycle graphs.
4 Signal response
In this section, we deal with the problem of how to compute
a signal response strategy for the m resources once we are
given a joint placement P Ď V m, which satisfies the cover-
age requirement (see Definition 1), and each of the m neces-
sary resources is placed at pi P P . To ease the presentation,
we assume that only one signal s is present in S and that
T psq “ T , omitting s in our formulas. The general case with
multiple signals can be obtained by simply refining notation.
The extra computational cost due to signals is linear in their
number.
In general, any resource i will always move along a cover-
ing route. Let us denote with Ri the set of covering routes for
resource i starting from pi (we will omit the dependency on
pi since P is always fixed in the scope of a signal response
game). In order to compute the covering routes, we resort the
exact and approximate methods proposed in [Basilico et al.,
2015a]. The presence of multiple resources introduces the
coordination dimension [Basilico et al., 2010]. We consider
three coordination schemes and define three Signal Response
Oracles (SRO). Each oracle works on a different game model
and returns the signal response strategy from a given joint
placement P under the corresponding scheme. Strategies for
D and A are denoted as σD and σA, respectively. If not de-
fined differently, σA : T Ñ r0, 1s gives the probability σAptq
of attacking a target t.
4.1 Full coordination SRO (FC–SRO)
In the full coordination scheme, we assume that D acts as
central planner and executor of the signal response strategy.
In other words, D has full control over the resources at any
time of the game. It computes a joint strategy for them
and jointly moves them on the graph according to it. This
scheme can describe scenarios where resources are connected
to a central control unit from where orders are issued (e.g.,
police patrols equipped with radio transceivers). The secu-
rity game originating from this scheme is played by D and
A where σD : R Ñ r0, 1s, R “ Śmi“1Ri and σDprq is
the probability of playing the joint covering route r. We de-
fine Ipr, tq as a function returning 1 if and only if target t is
protected by r (we allow r to be both a joint and a single–
resource covering route) and 0 otherwise. For any r P R
and t P T , pr, tq is a game outcome where D and A receive
UDpr, tq “ 1´p1´Ipr, tqqpiptq and UApr, tq “ 1´UDpr, tq,
respectively. The game is constant–sum and can be solved
computing the maxmin strategy with a linear program. How-
ever, each Ri can have exponential size and its computation
entails the resolution of an NP–hard problem. Even adopt-
ing the approximated method and working with incomplete
sets of covering routes would require us to enumerate over all
the possible combinations to construct the space of joint cov-
ering routes, which are exponentially many in the number of
resources. However, we observe that in our case there always
exists a minmax equilibrium where D plays on at most |T |
routes as shown in from [Shapley and Snow, 1950].
Theorem 5 Given a game with K players in which all the
players k P Kzt1u have m actions and player 1 has n ac-
tions, there is a minmax strategy of players Kzt1u in which
the support of each player has a size not larger than n.
For this reason, we devise a row–generation approach that
iteratively generates rows in the game matrix (joint covering
routes). The row generation routine first generates, for each
resource i, a set of covering routes Ri. Then, it considers a
joint covering route r1 (initial covering route). Set R “ tr1u
and solve the corresponding constant–sum game using R as
the action space forD. Solve the following ILP where xir is a
binary variable taking value of 1when route r P Ri is selected
for resource i, yt is a binary variable taking value of 1 when
target t is protected by the set of selected covering routes, and
σA is A’s minmax strategy in the previously solved game.
argmax 1´ ÿ
tPT
σ
Aptqpiptqp1´ ytq s.t.
mÿ
i“1
ÿ
rPRi
Ipr, tqxir ´ yt ě 0 @t P T
ÿ
rPRi
xir “ 1 @i P t1 . . .mu
From the solution of this problem we obtain a joint cover-
ing route rˆ where resource i plays route i if xri “ 1. Clearly,
rˆ is a best response forD in the incumbent game equilibrium.
If rˆ R R, then it is included and the game is solved again,
otherwise the exact solution of the minmax problem is found.
In the above formulation, only the integrality constraints on
yt can be relaxed still obtaining a feasible optimal solution.
Theorem 6 Deciding if there is at least a joint covering route
where a subset of targets T 1 can be covered with at most k
single–resource routes is NP–hard.
Proof. A simple reduction from SET–COVER can be given
by map the universe on T 1, set m “ k, and define R1 “
R2 . . . “ Rm a set of one route for each set Sj in SET–
COVER where the targets covered by the route correspond
to the elements of Sj . It is easy to see that SET–COVER ad-
mits a cover with at most k sets if we can cover T 1 with no
more that k single–resource routes (one for each resource). l
In practice, we empirically assessed that the following
heuristic method gives acceptable results. We solve the lin-
ear relaxation (on xir variables) an then sample a route r for
each resource r with probability xir. We iterate this double–
LP scheme until convergence, namely when the best response
computed by the above program is pure and already in D’s
support at the equilibrium.
4.2 Partial coordination SRO (PC–SRO)
Partial coordination models those situations where D can act
as central planner but cannot communicate with each resource
to prescribe a joint action. Another way to see this is to con-
sider each resource as a separate player that has interest in
cooperating with others but that cannot correlate with them.
Real scenarios falling in this scope can be characterized by
resources for which a communication with the control unit is
not available (e.g., patrolling units operating in stealth mode).
Team games [von Stengel and Koller, 1997] are a suitable
model to describe our security game under this coordination
scheme. We define a m ` 1 game where resource players
D1, . . . ,Dm compete together againstA. Each resource strat-
egy is defined as σDi : Ri Ñ r0, 1s, where σDi priq denotes
the probability of having resource i following covering route
ri P Ri. A game outcome is again defined with pr, tq (r is a
joint covering route) where each Di receives the same utility
UD as previously defined. The proper solution concept of this
game is the team maxmin strategy whose computation can be
described with the following non–linear program:
min
σD1 ...σDm
v s.t.
v ´ piptq
mź
i“1
`
1´ ÿ
rPRi
Ipr, tqσDi prq
˘ ě 0 @t P T
ÿ
rPRi
σ
D
i prq “ 1 @i P t1 . . .mu
σ
D
i prq ě 0 @i P t1 . . .mu, r P Ri
Notice that, the minmax value with three or more play-
ers can be irrational and not exactly computable even when
the payoffs can assume only three different integer values.
Approximating it with additive gap is, in general, hard.
More precisely, approximating the minmax value of 2 play-
ers against 1 player within an additive error of 13z2 where z
is the number of actions of each player is NP–hard even
with binary payoffs [Borgs et al., 2010]. [Hansen et al.,
2008] provides a quasi–polynomial algorithm with complex-
ity Opzl logpzq2 q approximating with additive error  the min-
max value with l players. It requires, for each player, to enu-
merate all the possible supports composed of logpnq actions.
However, such methods become impractical for the problem
we need to solve even for toy instances and non–negligible 
(e.g., with 10 actions, 2 resources, and  “ 0.5, the number
of needed iterations is of the order of 1018).
Thus, to cope with the resolution of this problem we pro-
pose the following iterative method. Consider a starting strat-
egy profile σˆD1 , . . . , σˆ
D
m with the corresponding game value νˆ.
Define νi as the value returned by the linear program obtained
from the above formulation by setting σDj “ σˆDj for any
j ‰ i. We then compute i1 “ argmaxi νi solving m linear
programs, set σˆDi1 “ σDi1 and repeat until convergence. Notice
that, at each iteration, the value of the game increases (non–
strictly) monotonically. Finally, once convergence achieved,
we have a random restart generating a new strategy profile
for D. Let us notice that, in the case the number of routes per
resource is large, a row–generation approach similar to that
described in the previous section can be adopted.
4.3 No coordination SRO (NC–SRO)
When no coordination is allowed between resources we are
ruling out not only strategy correlation but also joint plan-
ning. In this scenario resources are unaware of each other
and act as single players against A. This case is modeled
with m independent single resource signal response games
(as defined in [Basilico et al., 2015b]) where the game asso-
ciated with resource i has pi as starting vertex and is played
on the restricted set of targets Ti “ tt P T | ωpi,t ď dptqu.
For each game i, the maxmin strategy is computed taking Ri
as the action space of Di. However, although the defensive
resources are completely non–coordinated, A can observe
the strategy of each resource and play at best. Thus, given
the m resource allocation strategies obtained in this way,
we can compute the game value as 1 ´ maxtPT śmi“1 `1 ´ř
riPRi σ
D
i priqIpr, tq
˘
piptq.
5 Overall resolution approach
The contributions we presented are organized in the resolu-
tion approach sketched in Figure 1. We start by tackling
the problem of finding the minimum–size resource placement
by solving the associated SET–COVER formulation (or our
polynomial algorithm with trees and cycles). If the problem
cannot be solved exactly in a short time, we adopt the greedy
approximation algorithm of [Chvatal, 1979] and then apply a
simple local search to improve the greedy solution. Once this
step is terminated, we have fixed a number of resourcesm and
we address the problem of finding the best allocation strategy
for them. As previously stated, in absence of false negatives
and false positives the best allocation strategy when no sig-
nal is raised is to statically place the m resources in the best
covering placement. Such placement is defined as the one
from which the signal response game yields the maximum
expected utility. To deal with this, we resort again to a sim-
ple variation of the local search procedure [Musliu, 2006] to
enumerate covering placements of exactly m resources. For
each considered covering placement, we compute sets Ri for
each resource i as mentioned in the previous section and then
we run the signal response oracles we introduced.
Greedy algorithm / Local search 
Defensive resources minimization 
Covering placement enumeration 
Local search 
Routes generation 
Dynamic programming (exact/approximated) 
No-coordination  
SRO 
Full-coordination  
SRO 
Partial-coordination  
SRO 
Figure 1: Overview of the proposed resolution approach.
6 Experimental evaluations
To evaluate our algorithms we implemented a random in-
stance generator that leverages some domain knowledge we
gathered by discussing with representatives of the Italian
State Police. From such process, we were able to de-
velop a tool for randomly generating patrolling instances that
could represent realistic urban environments, such as streets,
squares or districts, capturing scenarios with police patrolling
units placed in police stations. In the graphs, all the vertices
are targets, |T | P t20, 40, 60, 80, 100, 120u, edges are unitary,
the average indegree of each vertex is 3, and penetration times
have been set according to the size of the instances as follows:
for |T | P t20, 40u, dptq “ 3, for |T | P t60, 80u, dptq “ 4 and
finally for |T | P t100, 120u, dptq “ 5. There is one single sig-
nal covering all the targets, corresponding to the worst case
in computational terms. Since the algorithms are anytime,
the whole resolution process depicted in Figure 1 is given a
timeout of 60 minutes, thus implicitly posing a limit on the
maximum size of instances that can be solved. All the nu-
merical results we report are averaged on 50 instances for
each |T |. For the instances employed here, we used the exact
method of [Basilico et al., 2015a] to generate the covering
routes, requiring a compute time comparable to the approx-
imation algorithm. We run experiments in MATLAB on a
UNIX computer with 2.3GHz CPU and 128GB RAM.
Resources and dispositions We initially evaluate the per-
formance of the algorithms to find the best covering place-
ment. As we discussed in Section 3.2, we tackle this problem
by solving an associated SET–COVER problem for which we
have an exact method based on an ILP and an approximation
one combining a greedy heuristic with a local search pro-
cedure. The ILP–based method scales up to instances with
500 vertices when evaluated in standalone runs and up to 120
vertices in the scope of the whole resolution process (in this
last case a portion of time is necessarily spent for the other
subtasks listed in Figure 1). The approximation algorithm
achieves an average error ă 5% up to 500 targets, suggesting
that it can provide good suboptimal results even for settings
with more than 500 targets. In the following analysis, we use
the ILP–based method.
First, we focus on the characteristics exhibited by our ex-
perimental settings in terms of number of resources needed
for the covering placement and the degree of overlap over the
targets covered by the resources, see Figure 2.
We observe that the average number of resources is linear
in the number of targets (see Figure 2(a)), which is reasonable
in real–world scenarios.
To quantify the overlap degree induced by a given cover-
ing placement P “ tp1, p2, . . . , pmu we define two comple-
mentary indicators. We recall that Ti is the subset of tar-
gets that can be covered (reached by their deadlines) from
vertex pi (see Section 4.3). Then the following quantity
counts the number of extra coverings induced by P : η “řm
i“1 |T ppiq| ´ |T |. Notice that 0 ď η ď p|T | ´mqpm´ 1q
getting its maximum value when each resource covers a dif-
ferent subset of |T | ´m` 1 targets. We denote with τ “ η|T |
the average overlap per target and τˆ “ ηp|T |´mqpm´1q the nor-
malized overlap. Figure 2(b) shows how these two indicators
vary with the number of targets. The index τ grows linearly
in the number of targets due to the linear growth of the num-
ber of resources while τˆ has a slower growth since for any
resource i the number of covered targets |T ppiq| is usually
not as big as |T |.
Now we focus on the covering placement enumeration
phase and we evaluate the number of covering placements
that our algorithm is able to consider within a 60 minutes
deadline. Referring again to Figure 1, notice that each ad-
ditionally considered placement requires to compute the cov-
ering routes sets and to run one of the three SROs. This time
is dominated by the covering route computation phase, being
the time required by each oracle never exceeding 1 minute.
The number of generated covering placements is reported
in Figure 2(a). The curve grows reaching its maximum for
|T | “ 60 and then decreases. Indeed, when the size of the
problem is small, the algorithm terminates before the dead-
line, returning few placements. On the other side, when the
size of the problem is large, due to the time limit and the huge
amount of time required by the computation of the covering
routes, the time to compute new placements lowers signifi-
cantly and thus the curve decreases. We remark that we are
able to solve large instances up to 120 targets.
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Figure 2: Analysis of the instances before an attack.
SROs quality and performance Here we compare the per-
formance of the three SROs, both in terms of utility and com-
pute time. We exploit the solution returned by the NC–SRO
to initialize the PC–SRO and the FC–SRO (in this last case as
input for the row–generation algorithm). We evaluate the PC–
SRO both with 0 and 10 random restarts observing that the
improvement is not significant (ă 1%) and confirming that
choosing the solution of the NC–SRO as the starting point
is appropriate. For the FC–SRO, we evaluate both the exact
and the approximation row–generation algorithm, finding that
the average difference between the two objective functions is
negligible up to 120 targets (ă 1%), suggesting that the lin-
ear relaxation works very well in practice. In the results we
report below we use 0 random restarts for PC–SRO and the
exact row–generation algorithm for FC–SRO (returning thus
the optimal strategy). Figure 3(a) shows that enabling coor-
dination among the resources gives a significant burst in the
growth of the utility w.r.t. the number of targets, especially
after 100 targets. As expected, FC–SRO guarantees the high-
est utility. Interestingly, the performance of PC–SRO is very
close to that one of FC–SRO, suggesting that in our settings
the price of partial coordination is low. Figure 3(b) shows the
time ratio among the three SROs. The absolute times are all
very low (usually on average ă 20 seconds even for 120 tar-
gets). We observe that both FC–SRO and PC–SRO present a
linear growth in time w.r.t. NC–SRO but FC–SRO requires
less time. This suggests that the row–generation of FC–SRO
works very well, generating a small set of joint routes. Hence,
FC–SRO is the best oracle in terms of tradeoff between utility
and compute time, when full coordination is possible.
Finally, we evaluate the performance of the SROs as the
number of resources varies. We conduct experiments on
graphs with |T | “ 80 (instances with more targets require ex-
cessive computational costs) in which the best |P | = 4. Then,
we consider the resources as guard posts and we assign up to
5 mobile patrollers to each guard post. The FC–SRO needs
more time w.r.t. PC–SRO, as it can be seen in Figure 4(b),
but this difference is very small. Observing Figure 4(a), we
note that also in this case enabling coordination gives more
utility. Thus, we conclude that the FC–SRO is the best per-
forming method, providing the highest utility and requiring
only slightly more time than the PC–SRO. On the other side,
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Figure 3: Utility and time ratios of the three SROs.
the PC–SRO is a viable good solution since, even without co-
ordination, it still provides good utility results.
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Figure 4: Utility and time ratios with more resources per
guard post.
Utility trend in time Now we focus on the evolution of
the utility in time, after different placements have been enu-
merated and evaluated. Figure 5 shows two instances with
|T | “ 60 where we compare the performances of the three
oracles with one resource per guard post. While NC–SRO is
quite constant even though several placements are evaluated,
FC–SRO and PC–SRO utilities increase, with the former al-
ways preceding the latter due to its lower computational time.
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Figure 5: Utility trend in time.
7 Conclusions and future research
In this work, we considered a security game with the pres-
ence of a spatially imperfect alarm system and we addressed
the novel generalization towards settings in which the De-
fender can control multiple mobile resources. We proposed
a resolution approach for dealing with the new algorithmic
problems that such generalization introduces. First, we ad-
dressed the problem of computing the minimum number of
resources required in a given setting and then we tackled the
determination of the best signal response strategy under dif-
ferent resource coordination schemes.
Future direction of research will involve adaptations of our
algorithms to cases in which the number of resources avail-
able to D is greater than the ones required for the minimum
covering placement. In addition, we plan to work on the
model by allowing the presence of false positives and missed
detection in the alarm systems as well as the presence of mul-
tiple resource from the attacker side. These extensions are
naturally driven by real–world requirements to which secu-
rity games must comply.
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